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 Chris Brown has been one of the most important figures in constituting International 
Political Theory (IPT). Others have played crucial roles as well, including some of those 
included in this volume. Yet it is Brown, arguably, who has been central to putting political 
theory in conversation with international relations theory. His ability to synthesize, critically 
assess and push the boundaries of these adjacent theoretical perspectives has helped to frame 
world politics in ways that go beyond traditional and often staid debates. Perhaps even more 
importantly, Brown has connected sophisticated theoretical debates, both in contemporary 
and historical theory, with pressing dilemmas of global politics in the current age. He has 
consistently refused to keep theory distinct from the ‘world’ and has also refused to let the 
‘world’ of politics resist normative theorizing. In so doing, he has brought forth the centrality 
of ‘judgment’, the ability to draw upon forms of political wisdom and use them to critique 
political practice. The cultivation of judgment about world politics is where Brown’s IPT 
makes its most distinctive mark. 
 This introductory chapter will situate Brown’s work in relation to wider themes in 
IPT. We provide some context to Brown’s development as a scholar, looking to the ways in 
which his ideas emerged in relation to different debates in both political theory and 
international relations. The first section provides a brief intellectual biography. The second 
section explores the idea of IPT through an engagement with three books through which he 
has defined the field: International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (IRT) 
(1992); Sovereignty, Rights and Justice (SRJ) (2001) and International Society, Global 
Polity: An Introduction to International Political Theory (ISGP) (2015). In the first work, he 
poses communitarianism against cosmopolitanism, in the second he poses sovereignty against 
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rights, and in the third he poses international society against global polity.1 These overlapping 
frames, while different in important ways, reflect a core facet of Brown’s approach – 
negotiating the space between a world of states and a world of individuals. This structure 
remains at the heart of many treatments of IPT, and has, as such, shaped the theoretical 
orientation of many in the field. As Brown has moved away from his initial framing of the 
field in this way, this section instead looks more directly to how he understands the task of 
IPT; that is, how he moves from an idea of ‘normative theory’ to IPT. We will also briefly 
address the issue of Brown’s relation to the ‘English School’ of International Relations in this 
context, as this is an approach which also seeks to locate a relationship between the 
individual and the state, especially with the emergence of recent debates about ‘world 
society’ (Buzan 2004). 
 The next part of the introduction looks to his engagement with the predominant liberal 
international order, particularly the ways in which powerful states in the Atlantic and wider 
European context have shaped discourses of human rights, humanitarian intervention, and the 
use of military force. This section looks to how Brown both defends and critiques liberal 
internationalism. For instance, he has argued in defence of human rights, yet also pointed out 
that such rights cannot work without developing cultural frameworks that enable the practice 
of such rights (Brown 2010b). He has defended the importance of a global polity in which 
rights and democracy are prominent, yet also noted that objections to universalism is not the 
result of simple selfish interests, but arises from a principled resistance to colonialism and a 
valid moral defence of sovereignty (Brown 2015: 216). It explores briefly his reflections on 
cultural pluralism, an issue that animates a great deal of his work. 
                                                          
1 The books include much more than these simple dichotomies, and Brown has sought to resist the 
‘cosmopolitan vs communitarian’ framework as the defining feature of his work and or IPT.  
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The concluding section of the introduction turns to the theme of political judgment, 
which appears throughout his career and especially in the collection of essays entitled 
Practical Judgment in International Political Theory: Selected Essays (2010). Brown draws 
his idea of judgment from a broadly Aristotelian account, though he is by no means confined 
to the ancient Greek understanding of this term. Rather, perhaps inspired by Aristotle rather 
than following him, Brown points to the contextual process by which individuals in positions 
of leadership must make decisions about difficult matters. But those decisions are not simply 
for leaders. He writes for a wider audience than just the elites, having published books for 
classroom use, including his bestselling textbook, Understanding International Relations, 4th 
ed (Brown and Ainley 2009). He argues he is in the business of ‘public education’ which is 
relevant for the student as much as for the leader, suggesting that ‘we must try to cultivate the 
faculty for judgment in ourselves that we hope [political leaders] will also cultivate’ (Brown 
2010: 249).  
Intellectual Biography 
 One of the defining features of Brown’s scholarship is that he is grounded in both 
historical and contemporary international affairs. Indeed, he notes that ‘anyone who wishes to 
be taken seriously as a theorist of international relations had better be steeped in international 
history and have a very good knowledge of current affairs as well as a familiarity with the 
classics of political thought’ (Brown 2010: 3). Theorists of IPT have benefited from this 
grounding not only by reading his work, but taking his classes, engaging with him at 
conferences, and even interacting with him on social media. In all these realms, Brown 
refuses to remain in the world of pure theory (though he is well-grounded in this as well, as 
will become evident below) but demands that theorists take seriously the tensions and 
complexities of the contemporary international order.  
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 This grounding in politics and history comes, perhaps, from the trajectory by which 
Brown became part of academia.2 In 1963, upon graduation from secondary school, Brown 
entered the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. He wished to study history, so after 
receiving very strong exam marks, the Civil Service gave him three years leave to pursue a 
university degree, which Brown undertook at the London School of Economics. While at 
LSE, he fell under the influence of Philip Windsor and so transferred to International 
Relations. After receiving a First (a much more difficult achievement at that time than it is in 
the modern British university), Brown received a scholarship from the Ford Foundation 
funded Centre for International Studies at LSE, and so began work toward his PhD. 
 Brown took up a post at Kent University before completing his PhD. In fact, he 
abandoned his thesis, which was on uses of history in international theory and the rise of 
post-behaviourist scholarship, a topic which informs some of his scholarship to this day. He 
realized in the 1990s that having a PhD might be a benefit, so took one on the basis of his 
then recently published book, International Theory: New Normative Perspectives (1992) 
through a staff scheme at Kent. Outside of a short stint as a visiting lecturer at the University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Brown remained at Kent until 1994. For four years, he was 
Professor of Politics at Southampton University, then was appointed to a chair in 
International Relations at the LSE in 1998, where he remained until his retirement in 2014.  
 Brown published only a few works during his early career, a period which allowed 
him to read widely and deeply across political theory and international relations, something 
he notes is less available to many scholars today in academia as the pressure to publish has 
become intense (Brown 2010: 3). Brown’s ability to speak to so many different theoretical 
traditions and connect those with contemporary political events both domestic and 
international reflects the benefits of reading before seeking to publish. He also notes that he 
                                                          
2 See Brown’s description of his intellectual trajectory in Brown 2010: 1-16. 
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benefited greatly from colleagues outside of his department as well as inside at Kent 
University, for they provided him insights into trends in the humanities that enabled him to 
better appreciate postmodern theoretical developments. The increasingly specialized nature of 
academic scholarship today militates against such humanistic learning, a fact that 
contemporary scholars of IPT should recognize and perhaps work toward altering. One might 
argue that IPT can only work within a humanistic approach, for it requires training and 
knowledge of such a range of different theoretical ideas.  
This background knowledge was further enhanced during his time in the United 
States, where he shared a department with Jean Bethke Elshtain and William Connolly during 
the academic year 1981-1982 the former a leading feminist (and later realist) thinker of 
international relations and the latter one of the most important postmodernist political 
theorists whose work continues to inform scholars in IR. Brown notes that Connolly has been 
a major influence on this thinking, particularly in coming to grips with the complexity of 
pluralism within liberal societies, though it is unclear whether or not Brown would continue 
to follow some of Connolly’s political and theoretical ideas (Brown 2010: 4). 
 Brown published only one journal article and one report in the 1970s, both on 
International Political Economy (IPE). These publications came, in part, through the 
influence of Susan Strange, who was seeking to develop IPE as a separate field within IR. 
Brown’s work returns to Strange at different points in his career (e.g., Brown 2002: 232-235), 
though perhaps her bigger influence is that, like Brown, she sought to carve out a space 
within a dominant discourse for an alternative framing of IR. Beginning with his 1981 
publication in the Review of International Studies (Brown 1981), Brown began to push IR 
scholars to a greater engagement with political and ethical theory. This work culminated in 
his book, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Brown 1992), which 
set the stage for his framing of IPT, explored in more detail in the next section.  
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Framing and Reframing IPT 
 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, three of Brown’s books constitute a 
theoretical framework that integrates a range of theoretical positions in order to better 
understand and evaluate international relations. Only the third is written explicitly as a 
textbook, though really all three do not fall easily into a ‘textbook’ or ‘monograph’ category; 
undoubtedly, this reflects Brown’s approach to his career, where teaching and research 
inform each other. Brown has authored a bestselling general IR textbook as well, 
Understanding International Relations, now in its fourth edition (2009). This text should not 
be ignored in developing an understanding of how Brown conceives of IPT, for it presents IR 
theory as including ethical dimensions, something that many other textbooks refuse to do, 
though we do not address it here at any length.3 
 In IRT, Brown proposes a conceptual distinction between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism as a way to categorize thinking within IR theory. This framing does not 
capture all the possible theories, but Brown uses it to understand the competing normative 
orientations that underlie IR theories. But because he largely leaves this framework behind, a 
better focus is on how he understands the task of IPT. This requires appreciating his initial 
approach to the idea of what it means to do ‘normative’ theory. In IRT, he defines it in this 
way:  
By normative international relations theory is meant that body of work 
which addresses the moral dimension of international relations and the 
wider questions of meaning and interpretation generated by the 
discipline. At its most basic it addresses the ethical nature of the 
relations between communities/states, whether in the context of the 
old agenda, which focused on violence and war, or the new(er) agenda 
which mixes these traditional concerns with the modern demand for 
international distributive justice. (Brown 1992: 3) 
 
                                                          
3 At the time of this writing, Brown is working on a revised 5th edition of this textbook. 
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Brown goes on to qualify this definition, noting that IR scholars have a resistance to the term 
normative, for it assumes that the role of such theory is to prescribe norms, and, as a result, 
that scholars in this realm have ‘some special knowledge which enables them to solve the 
difficult moral dilemmas of the day’ (ibid). He disabuses readers of this notion, pointing out 
that normative theorists might consider such ethical dilemmas and read through works which 
address such questions more than others, but, even if this is the case, ‘none of [this] amounts 
to any kind of right to prescribe’ (ibid).  
 The concern expressed here brings forth an important dimension of Brown’s work, 
one that not all normative theorists might accept. There has emerged, in recent years, a style 
of normative theory undertaken largely by political philosophers that does indeed seek to 
prescribe. Such works draw largely on analytical philosophical traditions of thought in which 
problems of war, peace, justice, and rights appear largely as problems of logic. It follows that, 
if careful thought is applied to these problems, shared conclusions will result. Brown’s work 
does not fall into this category of scholarship, and he has been explicitly critical of it in areas 
such as just war (Brown 2017). As Brown argues, these matters cannot be solved simply by 
better logical thinking or analytical precision. Instead, such matters require a form of political 
judgement which results from study of not just abstract theory but concrete reality, 
philosophical tradition, and, perhaps, lived experience of political life. The question of 
judgment will be addressed later in this chapter, but it would seem to be prefigured by this 
caution about defining normative theory early on his scholarship.  
  In defining his task in this way, Brown helpfully locates not just normative theorists 
but assumptions that orient much of the wider scholarship in IR. For instance, the importance 
of the national interest to many realist scholars relies on a valuation of the sovereign state 
over other institutional forms. While classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and George 
Kennan were explicit about the moral value of the state (see Lang 2007), the same moral 
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assumptions, usually unacknowledged, underlie much of the research agendas of neorealist 
scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz. This is not to disparage such works, but rather to highlight 
that their normative agendas should be acknowledged and perhaps better defended by those 
working these areas.  
 A second point arising from Brown’s framing is that he undertakes it through an 
engagement with the history of political thought. In his influential co-edited volume of texts 
drawn from this history, Brown (along with Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger) 
contextualize and make relevant this history (Brown et al 2002). In his scholarship, this task is 
done rather lightly by Brown, in such a way that these historical figures inform his work 
without falling into a purely historicist approach. Brown uses these figures in such a way that 
it both reveals how IR theory might be inheritors of traditions which they may not know of 
and also, more importantly, engages in a dialogue with them. For instance, in the chapter on 
communitarianism in IRT, Brown engages in an extended discussion of G. W. F. Hegel. One 
way to read Hegel in the context of IR theory would be to locate the ways in which realists 
such as Morgenthau inherited a Hegelian state worship which has informed the study of IR 
ever since. This link Brown acknowledges, but he also explores the subtleties of Hegel’s ideas 
in relation to other theorists, both those against whom Hegel was reacting and those who 
developed his ideas throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.4 Even more importantly, Brown 
does not simply accept Hegel’s theories, but notes the difficulty of accepting a ‘secular’ Hegel 
(Brown 1992: 64). This critical encounter with Hegel suggests how Brown’s work moves 
from ‘normative IR theory’ to International Political Theory; that is, instead of simply 
undertaking a history of political thought or IR theory, Brown is engaging in a critical 
dialogue with that history in order to better understand different positions within IR theory.  
                                                          
4 Mervyn Frost is perhaps the most prominent Hegelian among IR theorists, who also contributes to this volume; 
see Frost 1986 and 1996. 
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 Brown concludes IRT with a discussion of what was at the time of his writing a new 
set of approaches in IR theory – critical and postmodern theory. He provides a nuanced and 
careful overview of such theories, highlighting their contributions to a more critical analytical 
approach to international politics. This overview is reduced to one paragraph in SRJ (Brown 
2002: 17) and completely disappears from ISGP. He suggests that 
Some of this work is certainly valuable, but, on the whole, it is 
regrettable that it has come to play so prominent a role [in IPT]. When 
difficult and complex ideas genuinely illuminate important topics they 
must be confronted, but difficulty for its own sake is not a virtue and 
the narcissistic, hermetic quality of much of this work limits its 
relevance. (Brown 2002: 17) 
 
This critique of postmodern and critical theory reveals a further important point about 
Brown’s approach to IPT. It is clear from his overview in IRT that Brown is well versed in 
this work; as noted above, William Connolly, a leading postmodernist theorist, was a crucial 
influence on Brown early on in his career. Unlike many today, Brown has read not just 
Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker but Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, along with their 
forebears such as Nietzsche. That is, rather than the derivative work which constitutes so 
much of postmodern IR theory, Brown highlights how important it is for theorists to read 
those who provided the foundations for this work. In addition, Brown’s critique is not 
necessarily one of substance but of style. This point is not meant in a disparaging way about 
Brown. Instead, it indicates how important style is to his presentation of ideas. Any reader of 
Brown’s work will recognize his ability to make complex theoretical arguments accessible 
and relevant, something that many theorists, whether they be analytic moral philosophers, 
postmodernists, or neorealists, fail to do. IPT is about reading and drawing from theorists 
across a wide spectrum without falling into an overly specialized discourse that fails to 
connect with issues and concerns of the contemporary condition.  
 SRJ continues with the broadly defined cosmopolitan/communitarian framework, 
though it largely eschews those terms; indeed, Brown argues that the distinction perhaps 
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simplifies things more than clarifies (Brown 2002: 17; Brown 2010: 8). Instead, by locating 
sovereignty in relationship to rights, Brown points to the underlying moral frame of the 
community and the individual. Here we begin to see the influence of liberal thought on 
Brown’s work, a topic explored in the next section. Brown also distinguishes this work from 
his previous one by seeking to set aside the idea of ‘normative theory’, suggesting that SRJ is 
about ‘interpretation’ (Brown 2002: 3). In so doing, and in highlighting the three terms 
sovereignty, rights and justice, this book has a stronger political theory orientation then the 
previous one. It is here that the idea of IPT begins to take shape as a conscious endeavour.  
 SRJ explores a number of important themes, some of which extend those previously 
addressed in IRT. Completed only weeks before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the book 
includes a short prologue addressing the significance of that event. At the same time, it notes 
that the work as it stands speaks directly to the underlying themes brought forth by the attacks 
and the ensuing debates about the clash of civilizations and the rise of violent non-state actors. 
The last three chapters explore cultural diversity and the state system, which became (and 
continue to be) directly relevant to the conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East. One 
point he makes in responding to September 11 is directly relevant to how he understands IPT. 
He notes that Samuel Huntington’s idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ while raising an important 
point, simplifies and essentializes a number of complex themes which the field of IPT seeks 
to interpret. In response, Brown argues 
One, possibly desirable, alternative to a clash of civilization is cross-
cultural dialogue – but only if it is understood that dialogue is not an 
easy option. The only dialogue worth having, that is not simply an 
exchange of clichés, is one in which all the parties examine critically, 
as well as set out, their own values. ‘Westerners’ must examine their 
role in the various conflicts that poison Middle Eastern politics, and 
must address the demands for global social justice that emanate from 
the losers in today’s world economy, but, equally, Muslims must ask 
themselves whether it is really plausible that all the woes of the so-
called world of Islam are the responsibility of America, and, in 
particular, whether the savage theology of the al-Qaeda network and 
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the Taliban deserves the respect it receives in many mosques and in 
the independent Arab media. (Brown 2002: xii) 
 
This is a powerful call to those interested in international relations to avoid simplicity on 
either side of the debate. Asking all interested parties to critically assess and, perhaps more 
importantly, set out value orientations is a challenge and an opportunity. Brown’s efforts to 
set out the ‘Western’ tradition reflects one side of this approach, and his request that others do 
the same from within their own traditions represents a more vigorous and robust form of IPT 
than is sometimes found in efforts at interfaith dialogue or comparative political theory.  
 His most recent book of IPT is the one most explicitly presented as a textbook. 
International Society, Global Polity (2016) moves his framing further away from the 
cosmopolitan/communitarian structure found in IRT. Instead, ISGP presents the issues of war, 
justice, and human rights through the framework of a society of states versus a global polity 
of agents which includes states but also puts individuals and other actors forward as important 
parts of the international system. International society draws on both international law and the 
‘English School’ theories of IR, bringing them together in a creative way to understand the 
use of force, human rights, and humanitarian intervention. The global polity idea is not a 
purely cosmopolitan alternative, however, for Brown notes that to see the world as a global 
polity does not remove states but understands them as one among many agents in the 
international order. It does, however, like cosmopolitanism, put the individual person first and 
understands that person’s rights and responsibilities differently than a purely society of states 
approach. In so doing, Brown is able to reframe issues such as distributive justice, 
international criminal law, and humanitarian intervention in new and interesting ways.  
 This alternative framing reminds IPT theorists of the importance of certain strands in 
IR theory. At one level, this should not be surprising, for Brown has always seen IPT as 
related to IR theory. But, for some who come to IPT from disciplines such as philosophy and 
who adopt more strictly liberal cosmopolitan orientations, the idea of a society of states makes 
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little or no sense. As such, Brown’s framing here provides an alternative to some of the staid 
debates about just war, distributive justice and human rights that often animate such theorists. 
In some sense, Brown’s approach in this book is to look at the same issues and events through 
the two different framing prisms, resulting in, for instance, two parallel discussions of 
intervention and humanitarianism. Importantly, his argument is not a progressive one in 
which the society of states is replaced by the global polity; rather, his argument is that the two 
sit side by side in the world order and result in conflicting understandings and moral 
valuations of what is going on around us.  
 One interesting question in this context, and one certainly also entertained by the title 
of International Society, Global Polity, is whether Brown – or, more correctly: Brown-style 
IPT – actually is part of the so-called ‘English School’ of International Relations. While 
opinions on this issue vary, and the question about membership might not be that useful if the 
person in question repeatedly insists that he is not a member, the English School certainly 
features prominently in Brown’s thought. While not counting him in the inner circle, Buzan’s 
bookkeeping on the subject lists him as ‘regular contributor’, the definition of which being 
someone who has ‘written three or more substantial items directly on English school topics’ 
(Buzan 2014: 1).. 
We argue that Chris Brown’s relation to the English School can best be described by 
three characteristics: Firstly, he seems to broadly agree that the analytical triptych of an 
international system (of states), and international society (of states), and a world society 
and/or community (of, according to version, non-states only or non-states and states together) 
is a useful figure for describing the social orders of international relations. However, 
secondly, he remains critical of the English School’s emphasis on international society in this 
context. This criticism pertains not primarily to empirical diagnoses about the existence of a 
social formation that can be described as an international society of states. Rather, in a 
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criticism that actually resonates with much of Brown’s criticism of IR theory that is not IPT, 
her argues ‘that an approach that places primary emphasis on the nature of international 
society is likely to isolate itself from the wider discourses of political and social philosophy in 
ways that cannot be defended in terms of any alleged sui generis features of international 
relations’ (Brown 2000: 91; emphases in original). Thirdly, however, for all his professed 
non-membership in the English School, when it comes to confronting its thought with 
theoretically quite different takes on international politics and world order, there is an 
impression that he would rather err on the English School side (see, for example, Brown 2004 
in relation to systems theory).5 
In ISGP, Brown once more seeks to distinguish his approach from those more 
prescriptive theorists of IPT. In so doing, he differentiates IPT from ethics and international 
affairs, though he certainly acknowledges the importance of those undertaking this work, for 
instance at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, and their house journal 
Ethics & International Affairs.6 For Brown, though, his approach is that of a political theorist, 
one whose job is not to advocate for policy prescriptions but to interpret and clarify. This 
matches his call in the prologue to SRJ, in which he asks us to ‘set out our values’ a task 
sometimes assumed rather than undertaken.  
 In sum, Brown has framed and reframed IPT through these three texts. In so doing, he 
has developed the field of IPT in important and interesting ways. Admittedly, some issues and 
concerns slip through these frames, leaving us without his powerful insights into important 
matters such as world religion and the environment. But, despite these lacunae, Brown’s 
understanding of IPT has shaped our understanding(s) and provides a powerful tool by which 
to interpret and evaluate the world around us.  
                                                          
5 It’s like not being a FC Southampton fan, but still favouring it over all the others (if it’s not Chelsea, that is).  
6 One of Brown’s early publications is in Ethics & International Affairs, an effort to redefine Hegel for a 
generation of theorists who saw him as a foundation for German militarism; Brown 1991, reprinted in Brown 
2010. 
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Liberalism and Brown 
 Brown is not associated with liberal IR theory or even liberal political theory. As 
indicated in the previous section, his work seeks to interpret the ways in which various IR 
theories assume certain normative agendas and/or value based assumptions. One of the 
dominant underlying theoretical assumptions in the study and practice of international 
relations is liberalism. As a result, IPT, as with many other theoretical approaches, might be 
read as a response to this underlying liberal agenda. Can we read Brown’s work in a similar 
way?  
 Brown was influenced by one of the leading theorists of liberal political theory, Brian 
Barry. In saying this, however, Brown notes that the shape of his political theory (and perhaps 
political views) is closer to a communitarian thinker, Michael Walzer (Brown 2010: 4).7 He 
notes in his intellectual biography that he read widely and, one can imagine, sympathetically a 
number of Marxist and critical theory works on global politics. And, as noted in the previous 
section, he was greatly influenced by the postmodernist theories of figures such as William 
Connolly. It is clear, though, that in reading through the corpus of his works, Brown is less 
sympathetic to those works today. One reason for this is his argument that there has been a 
‘loss of faith in rational discourse of the liberal left’ (Brown 2010: 10), a category of scholars 
which includes both the critical/Marxist and postmodern perspectives. He is a strong critic of 
this failure of liberal theorist to think carefully through their presumptions and values, but at 
the same time he finds himself uneasy in this position. As he says, 
Had I realised then that the natural defenders of the Enlightenment were 
going to make such a poor fist of the task over the next two decades, I 
would have been a lot less willing to endorse their critics. I suppose I am 
really acknowledging a degree of hypocrisy here; along with a great many 
late-modern writers, I surmise, I was willing to kick against liberal 
rationalism largely because I thought it would always be there. Part of the 
                                                          
7 To call Walzer communitarian rather than liberal, though, distorts his views to some extent. While his work 
clearly has a strong communitarian orientation, he defends liberal ideas and practices in much of his writing and 
in his role as long time editor of Dissent magazine. 
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story that unfolds in subsequent essays reflects a gradual realization that this 
might not be the case. (Brown 2010: 11) 
 
This admission suggests that Brown sees part of his task as one of criticism, the kind of 
criticism described in the previous section, one of engaging in dialogue with others but only if 
they can engage in similar forms of critique. Liberalism provided a standard within which all 
such critique took place, but as Brown notes here, if the underlying rational discourse 
assumed by liberalism fails, then perhaps liberalism itself may need rescuing?  
 As expressed in this quote, though, Brown himself has been a rather pungent critic of 
many liberal assumptions. He acknowledges the importance of figures such as John Rawls 
(Brown 2002) and Charles Beitz (Brown 2005) in establishing liberal political theory and 
making it relevant for understanding the international realm. Indeed, he defends Rawls’ turn 
to the international more than some students of Rawls, such as Beitz and Thomas Pogge. In an 
essay on liberalism and the globalization of ethics, Brown acknowledges liberalism’s 
complexity, though he notes that it relies, ultimately, on the importance of the individual 
(Brown 2010 165). This essay explores one of the core dilemmas of liberalism, either 
domestic or international; the tension between the universalism of defending that individual 
and his/her rights and the necessity of accepting and tolerating differences among individuals 
and communities to pursue their own goals and life plans. This core liberal dilemma, one 
addressed by figures such as John Locke, informs much of Brown’s scholarship. That is, 
seeking to negotiate this space between the particular and the universal constitutes a central 
dimension of Brown’s work, and, one might argue, IPT more generally.  
 A different approach to this same issue comes out in Brown’s reflections on human 
rights. His essay ‘Universal Human Rights: A Critique’ (Brown 2010) provides a powerful 
and important assessment of the problems surrounding human rights. Criticisms of the 
universality of human rights abound, but Brown’s critique refuses to be a simple one of 
relativism. Rather, in a nuanced and powerful argument, he posits that human rights can only 
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work in particular kinds of liberal societies, one from within which human rights defenders 
either write or act. Without this cultural context, human rights cannot be advanced globally. In 
making this point, he does not privilege the Western cultures which first generated rights, for 
he notes that they themselves have perhaps lost that culture; for instance, ‘Americans have 
more and more rights, but less and less of a society within to exercise them’ (Brown 2010 :  
62). The conclusion of this chapter argues that, once more, liberal theorists need to better 
establish the theoretical foundations and assumptions that drive their advocacy of human 
rights. He concludes the chapter by arguing that only a focus on cultivating a particular kind 
of civil society will allow the emergence and protection of human rights.  
 On this point, we can suggest one way in which Brown’s approach to IPT can be seen 
in relation to liberalism. He has cultivated a particular understanding of pluralism, one that 
does not accept all cultures as good or worth pursuing, but as potential points of argument and 
debate. This means that engaging in debates about human rights cannot proceed from an 
assured assumption of a human nature which by necessity desires freedom. Rather, true 
pluralism requires careful understanding of and engagement with others and one’s own 
community. It requires judgment, for true judgment demands understanding not only the other 
but oneself. The final section of this introduction turns to this important political virtue in 
Brown’s work. 
Political Judgment and Pluralism 
 Brown entitles his 2010 collection of essays, Practical Judgment in International 
Political Theory. The book does not present a theory of practical judgment, but includes five 
essays which ‘represent the kind of practical-minded thinking that I wish to promote’ (Brown 
2010: 15). In those essays, which cover contested topics such as humanitarian intervention 
and pre-emptive military action, Brown exercises his own judgment in relation to ethical 
debates within the global realm. His judgements, particularly on the use of force, stand 
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counter to many assumptions and arguments that have framed these debates among his fellow 
scholars of IR and IPT. For instance, Brown argues, unlike many, that it is legitimate to be 
selective about when to engage in humanitarian intervention, which stands in direct contract 
to those who argue that the consistency in these matters is fundamental to their moral 
legitimacy. And, in the matter of pre-emption, Brown argues that we cannot simply rule it out 
on legal grounds or through interpretive strategies which paint the US and UK use of this 
strategy in the Iraq war as evidence of the moral evil of Tony Blair or George Bush. He points 
out that the hatred for these two leaders does not necessarily ‘build the capacity for making 
the right kind of judgment’ (Brown 2010: 249).  
 The idea of practical judgement arises from a number of sources. Aristotle provides 
one well known formulation through his theory of the virtues. For Aristotle, the human 
condition is defined by two basic factors: our intellect and our communal living. These two 
things combined separate us from the rest of the physical world. For Aristotle, they also 
generate the two virtues that define what it means to be the best kind of person, the 
intellectual and practical virtues. In describing the virtues, Aristotle first explains the moral 
virtues, which are those shaped by habit and political life. They are designed to cultivate an 
ability to choose how to act, not how to think. Their importance derives from the fact that 
humans live in community and so must be able to act together. The second type of virtue is 
the intellectual one, which he treats in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics which is derived 
from is discussion of scientific reasoning found in the Posterior Analytics. Scientific 
reasoning entails thinking from first principles and the reasoning that follows from them 
results in knowledge that cannot be otherwise.  
But reasoning must also take into account the particulars and the inductive process that 
provides a foundation for thinking. Scientific thinking is not the intellectual virtue on which 
Aristotle places his emphasis. Rather, it is deliberative thinking, or the dialectical process 
18 
 
described in the Topics. Interestingly, Aristotle argues that practical deliberation should not 
lead us to downplay scientific reasoning, only that to be a fully happy human person we need 
the deliberative form of reasoning in order to move us toward action. Combined with habits 
and character of the moral virtues, the practical wisdom of deliberative excellence results in 
the good person. 
Aristotle’s account of the virtues relies on a particular place and time, that of the 4th 
century BC Greek gentlemen scholar. Such a person no longer exists, and so perhaps we 
should not idealize this way of thinking. Indeed, his biology relies on assumptions about 
gender and generation that are fundamentally flawed, leading him to disparage the ability of 
women to achieve equality with men. Brown does not share those assumptions with Aristotle. 
Rather, Brown shares with Aristotle (and with many of the classical realists) the idea that any 
form of political reasoning must be dialectical rather than solely deductive and it must take 
into account the particulars of the situations within which such reasoning takes place. So, 
rather than being guided a universal liberal or legal logic to which all participants must agree 
in advance, Brown suggests a different form of reasoning, one which demands taking 
seriously the contexts, often very conflictual and even dangerous contexts, that shape world 
politics. Simple solutions based on Western ideals of human rights or the rule of law cannot 
be the sole way of thinking through the problems that bedevil the world today. 
This brings us back to pluralism. As noted in the previous section, Brown is motivated 
in much of scholarship with trying to speak to a plural world. He demands that critical 
reflection take place among all participants. The standards against which such reflection take 
place are related to and perhaps unconsciously parasitic on broad liberal ideas, but Brown 
does not allow those to serve as trump cards. Rather, he argues for a form of deep pluralism, 
one that respects the capacity of all persons to engage in critical dialogue and reflection on 
theirs and others practices. We may not agree on all his political judgments, but his demand 
19 
 
that we think carefully about how to go about making such judgments, is perhaps his most 
important contribution to the field of IPT.  
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